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Dance Writing and the Fear of 
Generalization 
Roger Copeland 
11 • • •  contemporary British and American aestheticians have 
devoted very little of their time and energies to a discus-­
sion of dance as an artform. Music, painting, poetry, and 
the other arts have been thoroughly analyzed, but the 
dance remains practically untouched by the aes1thetician's 
hand." - Gertrude Lippincott, The journal of Aesthetics 
and Arc Criticism, 1 949 
Anecdotal Evidence 
It happens to me quite often. I'll meet some people at a party. They'll 
ask me what I do for a living. I explain that I'm a college teacher. They 
ask me what I teach. I then rattle off the names of a number of sub-­
jeers (all of them related to the performing arts); but I fail to specify 
whether my areas of expertise are practical or theoretical. I mention 
1 '1theater." No lull in the conversation. I mention "film." No problem 
there either. Things proceed swimmingly until I mention "dance." 
Suddenly a quizzical, even disbelieving look settles upon the faces of 
my interlocutors. 
I used to be puzzled by their puzzlement, but now I think I under, 
stand it: I am not the world's most graceful person. (In fact, I can 
barely walk across the room without tripping over my own or some, 
one else's feet. )  And to most people, a "teacher of dance" is invaria, 
bly a teacher of dance technique or choreography. { It  simply doesn't 
occur to them that one might be a teacher of dance history, dance crit, 
icism, or - heaven forbid - dance theory. ) Hence their 
consternation. 
Eager to g,et the conversation back on track, I hasten to reassure 
them that the only dance,related subject I teach is dance aesthetics. 
"Dance what?" they invariably want to know. Not an unreasonable 
question, that. One doesn't expect the av,erage person to be 
acquainted with so rarified a subject. And even practitioners of the 
arts are likely to be nonplussed - tending as they do, to agree with 
Barnett Newman's dictum that "aesthetics is to the artist as ornithol, 
ogy is to the birds." 
But significantly - and this is really my point - itt doesn't matter 
greatly whether the person I'm talking to is a doctor, a stockbroker, 
an architect, or a professor of comparative literature ( in other words, 
someone well aware of the central role played by theory in the study 
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of the other arts). It's simply never occurred to any of them that one 
might ask the same (or similar) questions of dance that one routinely 
aslcs of painting, literarure, or film - or chat one might pursue those 
questions by employing similar methodologies. Dance remains for 
them something one does rather than something one chinks about. 
And as far as I can tell, dance is the only art that suffers from such 
prejudices. When I mention that I reach courses in theatre and film, 
people don't automatically assume that I reach acting, directing, or 
filmmaking. 
So why is it that most people continue to conceive of dance as some­
rhing one does ( rather than something one reflects upon)? I believe that 
this question is the logical starting place for any serious theory of the 
dance. ( A  theory, if you will, to help explain the virtual absence of 
theory. )  If we can illuminate this deep, abiding connection between 
dance and dcing, then we'll have gone a long way toward explaining 
why, 40 years after Gertrude Lippincott's complaint, dance still 
remains (virtually) untouched by the aesthetician 's - or for that mat­
ter, the theoretician's - hand. 
Dance, Theater, and Theory 
In her classic discussion of the relationship between ritual and theatre 
in ancient Greece, Jane Harrison refers to Dionysian ritual as a "dro­
menon" or thing done. It is not (primarily) a "thing seen" - some­
thing performed for the pleasure or edification of mortal spectators. 
Presumably, one doesn't watch a ritual, one actively participates in it. 
There's no designated viewing space for a passive audience. Our Eng­
lish word "theatre" by contrast derives from the Greek word "thea­
tron" which means literally "seeing place," or place for spectators. 
According to Harrison, the theatron evolved in ancient Greece as 
Dionysian rituals became secularized an.d lost their sense of magical 
potency. She describes this process as follows: "Some day there will 
be a bad summer, things will go all wrong, and the chorus will sadly 
ask, 'Why should I dance my dance?' They will drift away or become 
mere spectators of a rite established by custom.'' But at the same 
time, they will transform the ritual ( a  dromenon or "thing done") 
into an act of theater, a spectacle that can only take place in a 
theatron. 
For Harrison, the transformation is symbolized by changes in the 
physical architecture of the performance space (but it involves a trans­
formation of mental architecture as well): An arena dominated by an 
orchestra (in Greek, literally "dancing place") is supplanted by a new 
space whose very name derives from the accommodations it makes 
for spectators: 
We have seen that the orchestra, with its dancing chorus, 
stands for ritual, for the stage in which all were wor-
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shippers, all joined in a rite of practical intent. We further 
saw that the theatre, the place for the spectators, stood for 
art. In the orchestra all is life and dancing; (but) the mar­
ble seats are the very symbol of rest, aloofness from 
action, contemplation. The seats for the spectators grow 
and grow in importance till at last they absorb, as it were, 
the whole spirit, and give their name theatre to the whole 
structure; action is swallowed up in contemplation. 
(Ancient Art and Ritual) 
In their current English incarnations, the words theatre and theory 
seem unlikely companions. But if we chase them back to their etymo­
logical roots, it becomes evident that they share a common ancestry. 
For example, according to Eric Partridge, in his Short Erymological Dic­
tionary of Modem Engl ish, the root words for "theatre" are said to 
include not only "theatron" ("a thing compelling the gaze"), but also 
theorein c·a si.ght, an object of study, a speculation, hence a theo­
rem").  Turn to the word 0theory11 on the very next page, and you are 
referred back to "theatre''. At least erymologically, the rwo words are 
blood brothers. And in practice, both make similar demands on us: 
Both require that we detach ourselves from the icthing seen," that we 
stand apart from it, and examine it from a distance. 
The Persistence of Primiticism 
Are we any closer now to answering the $64,000 question: why do 
most people still think of dancing as something one does (a sort of 
ritualistic "dromenon") as opposed to something one might theorize 
about? Perhaps. Jane Harrison once predicted that dance would come 
into its own as an artform as our daily experience begins to feel more 
and more vicarious, as the perception of distance between ourselves 
and the "naturaP' world increases. Dance - for reason that I'll exam, 
ine in a moment - is thought to function as an antidote for this sort 
of distance and mediation. Dance is thus burdened with a compensa­
tory function, a primitivizing function if you will. It becomes the last 
remaining link between the increasingly urbanized present and an 
idealized past of •1connectedness" and unmediated sensory experience. 
It's important to emphasize that J>m talking about all forms of dance, 
not just those that are inspired by or based on the rituals of so-called 
uprimitive" peoples. 
Note for example, the tendency in much 20th century writing about 
dance to subtly, but intentionally blur the distinction between ritualis­
tic and theatrical dance, suggesting that the separation between specta­
tor and spectacle (even in the most secular, theatrical contexts) is 
somehow less distinct in the art of dance than in the other performing 
arts. John Martin for example, in his book The Dance, argues that 
uthe inherent contagion of bodily movement . . .  makes the onlooker 
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feel sympathetically in his own musculature the exertions he sees m 
somebody else's musculature." Pau l Valery, m h1s essay, "Phtlosophv 
of the Dance," writes that "part of our pleasure as spectators ( of 
dance) consists in feeling ourselves possessed by the rhyrhms so chat 
we ourselves are virtually dancing." Edward Bullough in his classic 
es.say about the concept of aesthetic distance, which he calls "psychi­
cal distance ," argues that dance is the art that most effectively minim­
izes the sensation of distance between perceiver and thing perceived. 
And quintessentially, in his book The Dance of Life, Havelock Ellis 
suggests that " Even if we are not ourselves dancers, but merely the 
spectators of dance, we are still, according to that Lippsian doctrine of 
Einfuhlung or 1empathy1 feeling ourselves in the dancer who is manif. 
esting and expressing latent impulses of our own being." 
In other words (or so the argument goes), while watching dance -
any form of dance - we participate to a greater extent than we do 
while watching the performance of a play or an opera. Dance is 
heralded as the most participatory of the arts, even if that participation 
remains virtual rather than actual. Dance is thereby entrusted with 
preserving that "participation mystique" which the anthropologist 
Levy,Bruhl identified as a chief characteristic of "primitive" life. (The 
term "primitive life" becomes synonymous with a more 1 1 immediate," 
less mediated, life. ) 
And the imagined satisfactions of 11primitive" life often prove 
highly seductive to the 20th,Century intellectual. Even as level headed 
a writer as Eric Bentley can begin to sound like a raving Wilhelm 
Reich or Norman 0. Brown when confronted with the primitive my5' 
teries of Martha Graham: 
She is a priestess. A present,day priestess of an ancient 
cult. Notoriously, she is the dancer of the age of anxjety. 
But she is not content, like, say, Jerome Robbins in his 
ballet on this theme, to discourse about anxiety with the 
resources of toP'drawer ingenuity. Nor is it enough to see 
neurosis from the vantage,point of neurosis as Robbins, in 
more earnest vein, occasionally may be said to have done. 
That is no vantage ... point at all. We can only express neu ... 
rosis in art by conquering it, if fragmentarily, if  momentar, 
ily. The only vantage-point to view sickness from is health. 
And health is found at the very foundations or nowhere. 
Down through the cerebral nervosities to the primal ener, 
gies, that is Martha Graham's journey. If we accompany 
her, even part of the way, must we not benefit? C'Martha 
Graham's Journey" in In Search of Theater) 
Cerebral nervosities? That's the sort of verbal infelicity one doesn't 
expect from a wonderful writer like Bentley. But we need to be toler, 
ant. The man was obviously in love - or at least in heat. And lest one 
think that such primitive satisfactions are provided only by hot, 
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steamy, expressive modes of modern dance, listen to what Edwin 
Denby has to say about the classic ballet: 
an educated late Paleolithic magician, if he dropped in on a 
performance of classic ballet in an air-conditioned theater 
would find a good deal he was familiar with - the 
immense., awesome drafty cavern, the watching tribe 
huddled in the dark, and in a special enclosure the power­
ful rhythmic spectacle . . .  As a magic man he would find it 
proper that the dancers are not allowed to speak. not 
allowed to make any everyday movement, to show any 
signs of effort, or even of natural breathing; and equally 
correct that the musicians are kept hidden in a ritual pit . . .  
If a New Yorker were to tell him, "But you're missing the 
point, ballet is an art, it isn't a ritual," he might answer, 
ccYou no like that word 'ritual.' You say it about our 
ballet, so I think maybe nice word." ("Forms in Motion 
and in Thought" in Dancers, Buildings. and People in che 
Streets) 
Denby may detect vestiges of primitive ritual even at The New York 
City Ballet; but for the most part, this sort of primitivizing remains 
latent rather than manifest. Even the most self-deluding spectator 
remains well aware of the difference between kinesthetic empathy and 
fullfledged, ritualistic participation. Indeed, in our heart of hearts, we 
know that we can no more return to ritual than to our iinnoc�nce. But 
even if we can't completely erase the distance between subject and 
object, spectator and spectacle, we can take pains to avoid increasing 
it. And that's where the bias against theory comes in. Indeed, for 
many people, dance's very raison d'etre is to defy the theoretical life 
(by denying us the distance and self-reflexiveness that theory 
demands). Even virtual participation can help to counter the Socratic 
assertion that the unexamined life is not worth living. Perhaps by 
reminding us that the unlived life is not worth examining. 
Staying Close to the Surf ace of the Dance 
What then are the implications of these biases for the person who 
wishes to write about dance? ls this the sort of primitivism that 
requires one to set sail for Tahiti, renouncing one's worldly posses­
sions and scholarly professions? Not necessarily. One can indeed still 
think and write about dance. But this latent primitivism has had a 
marked effect on the way we do that. It creates a subtle, but compell­
ing pressure to remain as close as possible to the surface of the dance. 
The critic Marcia Siegel speaks for many people in the dance world 
when she argues, 
Dance is a physical art, and I think the over-intellectualized 
kind of writing where the writer detaches himself from all 
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sensory ephemeral qualities and emotional connotations is 
just about worthless. The one inescapable fact about dance 
criticism is that you have to be in contact with the real live 
thing as it is performed. ( "Two Views of Dance," Arts In 
Sociecy, VIII, 197 1 )  
Deborah Jowitt is a bit less defensive about theory, but makes no 
secret of heT prefeTences: 
What I've come to believe is that the best dance criticism 
(at any rate, the dance criticism I admire most) stays inti­
mately connected to the work itself-neither leaping over 
it into romantic fancies or distant theorizing, nor smother­
ing it in irrelevant ideas, nor male ing it the pretext for a 
brilliant display of temperament. ("A Private View of Crit· 
icism," Arn In Society, Summer/Fall, 1976) 
Hence, the descriptive, empirical bias that continues to dominate 
"serious" dance writing. It derives from a desire (not necessarily a 
conscious desire) to stay as close as possible to the surf ace of the 
work, a desire not to break the peculiar bond of virtual participation 
that obtains between dance spectator and dance spectacle. It may even 
deTive in part from an uneasiness about the very act of writing about 
dance in the first place, and a compensatory desire to make the resul­
tant piece of writing literally resemble the dance in question as much 
as possible. 1 
This helps explain why, for the most part, American and British 
dance writing remains a form of impressionistic connoisseurship -
vividly, even lovingly descriptive, but essentially devoid of ideas and 
fearful of arriving at generalizations (on the assumption that to do so 
is to vitiate the sensory immediacy of the work). Such writing cele­
brates what William Blake called ''the holiness of particulars.'' (And 
appropriately, it was Blake who argued that "To generalize is to be an 
idiot." )  What may appear to be nothing more than good, old­
fashioned Anglo-American empiricism turns out to be attributable, at 
least in part, to latent primitivism. 
Agairut Interpretation 
Susan Sontag's notorious essay o( 1964, "Against Interpretation" 
never mentions dance, but it has great implications for both dance 
and dance writing. Consider this central paragraph: 
In a culture whose already classical dilemma is the hyper­
trophy of the intellect at the expense of energy and sensual 
capability, interpretation is the revenge of the intellect 
upon art. Even more. It is the revenge of the intellect upon 
the world. To interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the 
world - in order to set up a shadow world of 'mean-
ings. '..The world, our world, is depleted, impoverished 
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enough. Away with all duplicates of it, until we again expe­
rience more immediately '"'hat we have. 
Clearly. for Sontag. it is the peculiar achievement - perhaps even the 
spiritual mission - of certain art forms to hold interpretation and 
cheory at bay, to impede them or even ward them off. What they 
offer us (in its stead) is something infinitely rarer and more valuable: 
sensory immediacy. (' 'What is important now is to recover our 
senses. We must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more! ' )  
Alain Robbe-Grillet, makes a closely related argument in For a Ne«· 
Novel: 
At every moment, a continuous fringe of culture ( psychol­
ogy, ethics, metaphysics, etc.) is added to things, given 
them a less alien aspect, one that is more comprehensible, 
more reassuring. Sometimes the camouflage is complete: a 
gesture vanishes from our mind, supplanted by the emo­
tions which supposedly produced it, and we remember a 
landscape as austere or calm without being able to evoke a 
single outline, a single determining element. 
Both Sontag and Robbe-Grillet are prescribing an antidote to what 
Ortega y Gassat once called ''the progressive dis-realization of the 
world," the cannibalizing of the world by consciousness. "What we 
decidedly do not need now," wrote Sontag in the same essay, "is to 
further assimilate Art into Thought.,, Sontag and Robbe-Grillet both 
l�ng to reinvest the physical world with a sense of ecra-la' or sheer 
"thereness." 
But how does one embark upon this arduous, if not utopian, task? 
For Robbe-Grillet, the answer was a style of excruciatingly detailed 
description, virtually devoid of anthropomorphizing adjectives. That's 
what he's getting at when he complains that "We remember a lands­
cape as austere or calm without being able to evoke a single outline, a 
single determining element." By contrast, his legendary paragraph 
describing the surface of a tomato (in his novel The Erasers) keeps our 
attention focused obsessively on the physical characteristics of the 
object. ("The peripheral flesh, compact and homogeneous, of a fine 
chemical redness, is uniformly thick berween a band of shiny skin and 
the semicircular area where the seeds are arranged .. .  ") Sontag recom­
mends a similar strategy for criticism: 
What kind of criticism, of commentary on the arts, is 
desirable today? For I am not saying that works of art are 
ineffable, that they cannot be described or paraphrased. 
They can be. The question is how. What would criticism 
look like that would serve the work of art, not usurp its 
place? What is needed first, is more attention to form in 
art. If excessive stress on content provokes the arrogance 
of interpretation, more extended and more thorough des­
criptions of form would silence . . .  Equally valuable would 
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be acts of criticism which would supply a really accurate, 
sharp, loving description of the appearance of a work of 
art. This seems even harder to do than formal analysis . . .  
essays which reveal the sensuous surface of art without 
mucking about in it. 
Has anyone ever provided a better description of what critics like 
Denby and Croce and Jowitt do so brilliantly? Concemporary dance 
criticism may well offer us the single best example of what Sontag is 
advocating.2 And there's no denying that the best descriptive criticism 
serves an absolutely indispensable function, one necessitated by the 
fundamental differences between dance and the other arts. To the 
critic of literature or painting, "mere" description may seem rather 
pedestrian and even retrograde. But the dance critic is helping to 
establish the physical reality of the dance, or, at the very least, is lend­
ing some degree of permanence to an otherwise fleeting and ephe­
meral event. (This argument - that today's criticism is tomorrow's 
history - was a bit easier to make before the advent of film, video, or 
adequate notational systems.) 
Certainly if one were to generalize about the differences between 
the best 19th and 20th century dance criticism (the differences 
betWeen the writing of Gautier on the one hand and that of Denby or 
Croce on the other), the key distinction would seem to be the latter's 
greatly improved capacity for describing the exact contours of the 
body in motion. When we read Gautier we get a wonderfully vivid 
sense of the mental images or analogies that the dance evoked in his 
mind's eye ("Taglioni reminded you of cool and shaded valleys where 
a white vision suddenly emerges from the bark of an oak") but alas, 
very little sense of what the dance itself actually looked like. The best 
20th century dance writers haven't by any means abandoned the 
evocative phrase or the visual analogy, but their pritmary ambition is 
not to describe the effect that the work had on them. Rather they 
strive to provide the reader with a palpable sense of the work as a 
thing-in-itself. 
Who would fail to applaud this new emphasis on description? And 
who would underestimate the immense difficulty of the task? The 
ability to see movement clearly and describe it evocatively is a rare 
and wonderful gift. Of all the imaginable modes of dance writing, pre­
cise description is probably the hardest to do well. As John Ruskin 
once wrote (In Modem Painters), "The greatest thin.g a human soul 
ever does in this world is to see something and tell what it saw in a 
plain way. Hundreds of people can talk for one who can think, but 
thousands, can think for one who can see. To see clearly is poetry, 
prophecy and religion-all in one." 
And yet the dance world pays an undeniable price for this intense 
emphasis on vivid, loving description. Theory per se (theory as a 
separate branch of scholarship) is only the first casualty. Criticism 
9
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suffers from it as well. For in the best of aH possible worlds, history, 
criticism, and theory would crossfertilize one another. And indeed. 
the best criticism of the other arts has always possessed a theoretical 
dimension. But - with the possible exception of Andre' Levinson -
the dance world hasn't produced writers liike Harold Rosenberg, Cle­
ment Greenberg, Lionel Trilling, or R.P. Blackmur - critics whose 
talent for empirical description is enriched by a capacity to generalize 
about the significance of the experience. T.S. Eliot could well have 
been talking about dance critics when he wrote, "They had the expe­
rience, but missed the meaning." 19m not suggesting that dance writing 
will benefit from becoming less descriptive (only that it shouldn't set, 
cle for description, that it should regard description as a necessary, but 
not sufficient component of the critical task.) 
Dance Writing In The Age of Theory 
It's especially instructive to compare the current state of dance writing 
with the current state of writing about film. We might begin by noting 
the privileged place in the aesthetic pantheon that Sontag afforded to 
film in " Against Interpretation." ( Remember, this was 1964, long 
before the semioticians and the post-structuralists had launched 
their-now successful-invasion of film studies.) 
Ideally it is possible to elude the interpreters . . .  by making 
works of art whose surface is so unified and clean, whose 
momentum is so rapid, whose address is so direct that the 
work can be . . .  just what it is. Is this possible now! It does 
happen in films, I believe. This is why cinema is the most 
alive, the most exciting, the most important of all art 
forms right now ..  .ln good films there is always a directness 
that entirely frees us from the itch to interpret. 
But now in the Age of Theory - aided and abetted by the availability 
of video cassettes and the resulting ease with which one can conduct 
frame by frame analyses - film too has been caught up in the heur­
menutical net. And for many intellectuals, this amounts to nothing 
less than a loss of innocence, a fall from grace. And it may well be 
that dance is now the only art that still serves the anti-interpretive 
function formerly assigned to film. As Martin Leonard Pops has put 
it, n Anatomy presupposes a corpse, but the living body of dance is 
never still enough for a proper dissection ." 
Perhaps we in the dance world should consider ourselves lucky that 
dance studies haven't gone the way of film and literary studies where 
graduate students are infinitely more conversant with Barthes, Kris­
teva, and Derrida than with Proust, Joyce, or Dostoevsky. (When 
Oscar Wilde wrote that critics would become the artists of the future, 
his tongue was planted in his cheek. But when Paul de Man pro­
claimed that "Poetry is the foreknowledge of criticism," he wasn't 10
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kidding. ) I for one am not eager co see the sensuous surface of the 
dancer's body vaporized under the blowtorch of deconstruction 
(which typically produces more heat than hght). But surely there must 
be a middle ground, an alternative to description on the one hand and 
obfuscation on the otheT. 
Dance and tlie Thoroughly Modern lntelkctual 
In closing, what I've tried to emphasize is that the prevailing indiffer­
ence (or hostility) toward theoretically,�nclined writing about dance is 
not necessarily the consequence of a widespread indifference toward 
dance. The reasons that dance remains ( in Lippincott's words) ••virtu­
ally untouched by the aesthetician's hands'' is not that the inteHecrual 
is afraid of dirtying his or her hands with so sweaty and bodily an an­
form. Dancers and choreographers often think of intellectuals as peo­
ple who are uncomfortable with their own bodies and thus fundamen­
tally unsympathetic to dance as an artform. What a charmingly dated 
caricature! It ignores the reality of that peculiarly modern intellectual 
who is almost breathlessly eager to establish his or her Dionysian ere, 
dentials - the sort of intellectual who, upon hearing the word culture 
(as defined by Matthew Arnold) is more likely to reach for his poJY 
corn than to brush up his Shakespeare. The choice, for such people, is 
not between Milton or Bruce Springsteen. The point is to embrace 
both without compromising either one's seriousness or one's funki, 
ness. Like the angels in Wim Wender's film "Wings of Desire/' this 
sort of intellectual has grown weary of the ethereal and hungry for the 
material. 
Certainly, among the fabled "New York Intellectuals," a passion for 
Balanchine (and for Denby's and Croce's writing about Balanchine) is 
de rigueur. Granted, their commitment lfo (and knowledge of) dance 
may not extend beyond the obligatory seasonal pilgrimage to the New 
Y orlc City Ballet; but my point is that such people are by no means 
dance,O'phobes (although they may be Balletomanes ). In fact, they 
would feel incomplete, or at least impoverished, without their peri°' 
die dance fix. 
A passion for dance - or at least a passion for the idea of dance -
is absolutely essential for the modern intellectual. But is there a com, 
parable passion for ideas about dance? That, in my view is the prob, 
lem. And here we find something upon which the least intellectual 
members of the dance world (those who've never known the life of 
the mind) and the hippest, most "advanced" intellectuals (those who 
feel that they've outgTown the life of the mind) can agree. When it 
comes to writing about dance, these two varieties of anti, 
intellectualism merge into a single stream - of unconsciousness. The 
result is a critical shortage of genuine dance intellectuals, whom we 
might define as dance writers for whom ideas are as palpable as 
11
Copeland: Dance Writing and the Fear of Generalization
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1988
Dance Writing and che Fear of Generalization 1 53 
pirouettes (and who, at their best, can make ideas perform 
pirouettes-perhaps even fouettes ).  
Notes 
1 Even dance writers ofren subscri� to the �lief that dance is not only non· 
verbal, but anti-verbal. and that it constitutes a form of naruTal language -
preverbal. transcultural. and utterly resistant to paraphrase. The desire to stay as 
close as possible to the dance event helps explain some of the dance world's 
other peculiiariries as well. Even the annoying, but persistent critical practice of 
referring to major choreographers by their first names ("MaTtha," "M('rcc." 
"Twyla") begins to make sense if one thinks of it as still another manif('Station 
of this desir·e to maintain an intimate, informal relationship with the object of 
criticism . .  .Significantly, the first philosophical method to exert some influence 
on dance writing was phenomenology. The "pre-reflective," "pre-objective" 
nature of phenomenological description is perfectly consistent with the primiti· 
vist's emphasis on virtual participation. Maxine Sheets, in her book. The Ph� 
nomenology of Dance notes that the phenomenological method "bypasses all ques­
tion of the subject's objectivity or the object's subjectivity." 
At a conference in San Francisco in 1 98 1 ,  Susan Sontag was asked to comment 
on the state of current dance writing. Did she lament its lack of theoretical 
sophistication, its indifference to ideas or even generalizations! Far from it. She 
responded as follows: "I don't know what the desirable new ways of thinking or 
writing about dance might be, or if there are any ... My own view is that what is 
needed is for more people to write well, not for some people to write differently. 
All this is to suggest that l think dance criticism is in rather good shape; that is, 
that the prevailing assumptions about dance are more right than wrong." (see 
New PeTformo.nce, Vol. 3 No. 3 p. 72) 
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